In this paper, we present a prenex form theorem for a version of Independence Friendly logic, a logic with imperfect information. Lifting classical results to such logics turns out not to be straightforward, because independence conditions make the formulas sensitive to signalling phenomena. In particular, nested quantification over the same variable is shown to cause problems. For instance, renaming of bound variables may change the interpretations of a formula, there are only restricted quantifier extraction theorems, and slashed connectives cannot be so easily removed. Thus we correct some claims from Hintikka (1996), Caicedo & Krynicki (1999) and Hodges (1997a). We refine definitions, in particular the notion of equivalence, and sharpen preconditions, allowing us to restore (restricted versions of) those claims, including the prenex form theorem of Caicedo & Krynicki (1999) , and, as a side result, we obtain an application to Skolem forms of classical formulas. It is a known fact that a complete calculus for IF-logic is impossible, but with our results we establish several quantifier rules that form a partial calculus of equivalence for a general version of IF-logic reflecting general properties of information flow in games.
Introduction
In the last decade of the previous century, Hintikka and Sandu presented their so-called (Information) Independence Friendly Logic, henceforth IF-logic (see e.g. Hintikka (1996) and Hintikka & Sandu (1997) ). This logic extends earlier work in Branching Quantification (Henkin (1961) ) and Game Theoretical Semantics (e.g. the papers collected in Hintikka & Saarinen (1979) ). It can most easily be regarded as an extension of classical first order logic interpreted by means of a game semantics. The syntactical extension consists of a slash operator that can impose quantifications and connectives to be shielded from the scope of other quantifications. E.g. in the formula ∀x ∃y /x ϕ(x, y), the slash operator in ∃y /x indicates that there exists a y that is independent of x, such that ϕ (x, y) . In the game interpretation for that formula the player verifying the formula (we call her ∃loise) has to pick a value for y, or change its previous value, in ignorance of the value chosen for x by the falsifying player (we call him logic, and as a side result, an application to Skolem forms of classical formulas. Our rules establish a partial calculus of equivalences for our version of IF-logic, which apply also to the restricted versions of this logic, and include the classical laws on quantifiers transformation as a special case.
We will be rather precise when we present our proofs (the reader might judge 'pedantically precise') to assure we do not overlook other unexpected features of the logic, because we learnt not to rely on intuition too easily.
The logic 2.1 Syntax
We define the language IF * , which is a variant of the IF-languages as defined in e.g. Hintikka (1996) , Caicedo & Krynicki (1999) or Hodges (1997a In our language there are no restrictions on the use of quantifiers: within one formula, there may be several quantifiers binding the same variable, including nested occurrences. In this respect there is no formal difference with the language definitions of Caicedo & Krynicki (1999) , Hodges (1997a) or Hintikka (1996) (in the latter, IF-logic is defined as built from classical formulas, which also incorporates the possibility that nested quantifications over the same variable occur). A difference of our language definition with the literature is that in ∃x /Y we do not require that x does not occur in Y . In fact, allowing x to occur in Y is not different from allowing x to occur both free and bound, as in the classical formula R(x) ∨ ∃xP (x] : in ∃x /x P (x) the x occurring below the slash is free and the one in P (x) is bound. The quantification ∃x /x is will be interpreted as saying that a new value for x should be assigned independently of the value it previously had. On the other hand, we will show that for sentences nested quantifications over the same variable, and hence quantifications ∃x /Y with x ∈ Y , can be avoided without loss of generality.
Commonly, saying that ψ is a subformula of ϕ, means that the formula ψ has one or more occurrences in ϕ. In this paper, we will use the phrase 'a subformula ψ of ϕ' exclusively to designate a specific occurrence of a formula in ϕ.
In our game semantics we will need to associate with each subformula ψ of a formula ϕ a set of variables according to the following definition. [y = x] , and ψ 2 the right one. Then, going top-down into ϕ, we see that both ψ 1 and ψ 2 are within the scope of the quantifier binding x, but ψ 2 is also within the scope of the quantifier binding z. So Fr ϕ (ψ 1 ) = {x}, while Fr ϕ (ψ 2 ) = {x, z}. In this section it will be described how a game is used to evaluate an IF * -formula ϕ in a given suitable model A with respect to some suitable set of valuations V . There are two players: ∀belard, who tries to refute the formula, and ∃loise, who tries to verify the formula. Initially ∃loise makes the moves, but after an occurrence of ¬ (an overt occurrence, or a hidden one in e.g. ∀) the players switch turns. In the course of a play of the game the players will encounter subformulas of ϕ like ψ ∨ /Y ϑ or ∃x /Y ψ and valuations v. The subscript indicates that the choice of the next move has to be made independently of the values of variables in Y for v. This requirement does not show in the definition of the moves of the game, but it will put a restriction on the strategies that are allowed, as we will see in Section 2.3.
The game

Definition 2.8. A semantic game G is a triple A, ϕ, V where ϕ is an IF
* -formula, A a suitable model for ϕ, and V a suitable set of valuations for ϕ. 
If the position is of the form ¬ψ, v, t then the players change turns and the game is continued from position ψ, v, t * .
If the position is of the form ϕ 1 ∨ /Y ϕ 2 , v, t then t chooses L or R.
If L is chosen, the game continues from position ϕ 1 , v, t , otherwise from position ϕ 2 , v, t .
If the position is of the form ∃x /Y ψ, v, t then t chooses a value a and the game is continued from position ψ, v , t where v is the valuation such that v (x) = a and otherwise is the same as v (if v is defined for x then v(x) is overwritten, otherwise dom(v) is expanded).
If the position is of the form ψ, v, t , where ψ is an atom, the game ends.
If A |= ψ [v] then t has won the game, otherwise t * has won.
Note that player t in a position ψ, v, t of a play of A, ϕ, V is determined only by the position of ψ in ϕ, and does not depend on the valuation v or the actual play. In other words, each subformula is associated to the same player, in any play of the game.
Example 2.10 (Universal Quantifiers). Consider the following semantic game: A, ∀x∃y [x = y] , {λ} . The initial quantifier is an abbreviation for ¬∃x¬. So the game starts with the players interchanging turns. Thus ∀belard has to choose a value for x with the aim to make ¬∃y[x = y] true (because that will make the original formula false), so a value that makes ∃y[x = y] false. Then the players change turns again, and ∃loise has to choose a value for y with the aim to make x = y true. If she is wise, she chooses for y the same value as ∀belard has chosen (this strategy is denoted by y := x). Thus she wins.
The definition of ∀x /Y ψ as an abbreviation for ¬ ∃x /Y ¬ψ has the effect that in position ∀x /Y ψ, v, ∃ , ∀belard has to chose a value which makes ψ false, thus frustrating ∃loise 's aims. Likewise in ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 , v, ∃ he has to choose a conjunct that falsifies the original formula. More precisely, if we consider ∧ and ∀ as primitive symbols, the description of a play of the game should include the following clauses: 
If the position is of the form
Strategies
A semantic game may have many different plays. We are not so much interested whether one of the players accidentally wins (or loses) a particular play, but whether she/he has a strategy to win against all the initial positions and all plays of the opponent; that will be the criterion whether the formula is true or not. To define strategies properly, we define first the notion of a function being independent of a set of variables. 
Definition 2.12. A function f having for domain a set of valuations
V is called Y -independent (independent of Y ) if for all v, w ∈ V : from v ∼ Y w it follows that f (v) = f (w). It may happen that f : V → A is not Y -independent but that its restriction f W : W → A to a subset W ⊆ V becomes Y -independent.∨ /Y ϕ 2 in a se- mantic game A, ϕ, V is a Y -independent function c ϕ 1 ∨ /Y ϕ 2 : A F r ϕ (ϕ 1 ∨ /Y ϕ 2 ) → {L, R}. A choice function for a subformula ∃x /Y ψ in a semantic game A, ϕ, V is a Y -independent function c ∃x /Y ψ : A F r ϕ (∃x /Y ψ) → A.
Notations for valuations
In the course of this paper we will use several notations concerning variables, valuations and sets of valuations, and it is convenient to list them together.
Xy
the set of variables X ∪ {y} λ (the empty valuation) the valuation that is defined for no variable at all, so A ∅ = {λ} for any A {xy : ab} (is an example of the explicit notation we use for a valuation) the valuation that assigns a to x and b to y {xy : aa, bb} (analogous to the previous example) the set of valuations that consists of the valuations {xy : aa} and {xy : bb} vw 
the valuation that is not defined for x and that for all other variables is the same as v;
e. the set of valuations obtained from V by giving z the role of x; only defined if x ∈ dom(V ) and z ∈ dom(V )
Discussion
Now that all basic notions have been introduced, we can compare our notion with three closely related approaches.
Hintikka 1996, Hintikka & Sandu 1997
In Hintikka's original game interpretation for IF-sentences, the convention is adopted that "moves connected with existential quantifiers are always independent of earlier moves with existential quantifiers" (Hintikka 1996, p.63) . So ∃x∃y[x = y] is interpreted in IF in the same way as ∃x∃y /x [x = y] would be interpreted in IF * and the obvious strategy function y := x at the second quantifier is not available for ∃loise. But even then she has a winning strategy: x := a, y := a for a fixed element a of the structure.
This convention can be understood from the perspective of Skolem functions, which in Hintikka (1996) are taken as the syntactic counterpart of strategies in the game semantics. In classical first order logic, the arguments of a Skolem function replacing an existentially quantified variable y, are usually taken to be just the universally quantified variables in whose scope y occurred, and not the existentially quantified ones:
. In this case (as for classical first order logic in general) it is easy to see that both are equivalent. However, Hodges' example (∀z∃x ∃y /x [x = y], see p. 2) shows that the situation changes when switching to IF-logic: while its truth is equivalent to ∃f ∃g∀x [x = f (g(x) )] in the game reading of Hodges, it is equivalent to ∃c∃g∀x[x = c] (where c is a Skolem constant) in the Skolem-reading of Hintikka (1996) . An explanation of the effect of the convention is given with Theorem 13.4.
A prerequisite for Skolemization is the absence of nested quantification over the same variable. This prerequisite is almost always implicit or is avoided by assuming that the formula is in prenex form. It is not explicit whether IF-logic allows for nested quantification. This aspect is relevant for the claim that IFlogic is a conservative extension of classical predicate logic (Hintikka 1996, p. 65) . Either the claim is incorrect because nested quantification is not allowed, or the following example is an counterexample. For a proof that IF * is a conservative extension, see Thm 4.11.
Example 3.1 (IF-logic is not a conservative extension of full predicate logic). First, consider the following classical validity:
This is also an IF-validity: despite the convention that ∃loise's choice for z cannot depend on her choice for y, she can use the value of x to signal the value of y by choosing y equal to x, and also z equal to x. Now consider the following variation of (1), containing an extra quantification over x, which is a classical validity as well.
When ∃loise now gets to choose a value for z, ∀belard has in the mean time chosen another value for x (at the innermost ∀x). This means, x can no longer be used to signal the value of y, which was chosen to be equal to the first value for x. So, except in one-element models, ∃loise has no winning strategy: the formula is not an IF-validity.
Hodges 1997a
Following Caicedo & Krynicki (1999) , our semantic games A, ϕ, V have as many initial positions as there are valuations in V . A winning strategy for ∃loise does not pick the initial position but must be winning for all initial positions. Similarly for ∀belard . One may think that the initial position (called an opening deal by Hodges (1997a) ) is chosen from V by a random dealer or a third party. Which view one takes does not affect the definition of the game.
One could consider A, ϕ, V as a collection of games A, ϕ, {v} , v ∈ V, to be played in parallel with a 'uniform' strategy. In the literature on IF -logic this position is espoused by Hodges, who understands by 'game' one of the kind A, ϕ, {v} and calls A, ϕ, V a 'contest'. A uniform strategy prescribes the same choice for the games A, ϕ, {v} and A, ϕ, {w} if v ∼ Y w. Hodges calls V a 'trump' if ∃loise has a winning strategy for the contest A, ϕ, V , and a 'cotrump' if ∀belard has one. Properly formulated, this conception of a collection of games is equivalent to ours, and leads to Hodges' compositional semantics. But one has to be careful not to identify A, ϕ, V with the plain collection A, ϕ, {v} , v ∈ V, witness the example below where ∃loise has a winning strategy for each one of the latter games but not for the former.
Example 3.2. This example is based upon example 3.1 in Caicedo & Krynicki (1999) . Let ϕ be ∃x /y [x = y] . Let {y : 0} and {y : 1} denote the valuations that assign 0, respectively 1, to y. Consider now the game G 0 = B, ϕ, {y : 0} (recall that B = {0, 1}). Any choice function c ϕ has the singleton set {y : 0} as domain. Therefore it is a constant function and thus necessarily y-independent. The strategy x := 0 (i.e. choose for x the value 0) is then a winning strategy in G 0 . Likewise, x := 1 is the winning strategy in game B, ϕ, {y : 1} .
Let {y : 0, 1} denote the set of valuations consisting of the valuations {y : 0} and {y : 1}. Consider now the game B, ϕ, {y : 0, 1} . The only y-independent choices for x are, again, constant functions. However, if ∃loise plays the constant function x := 0, she loses if the initial position is ϕ, {y : 1}, ∃ . Likewise x := 1 loses in the other initial position. So there is no strategy that such that ∃loise wins in both initial positions of the game with {y : 0, 1}, whereas she has winning strategies in both games with v ∈ {y : 0, 1}.
Although the basic concepts are the same as in our approach, there is a technical difference that causes Hodges' semantics to be not equivalent with ours. This will be explained in section 6.
Väänänen 2002
It is common in the literature of IF-logic to consider only formulas in negation normal form (negations are only applied to atomic subformulas), this forces to treat also ∧ and ∀ as primitive symbols. In this context, Väänänen (2002) 
Inductive definition of satisfaction
In the previous section we have presented an interpretation of IF * -formulas in terms of winning strategies. If we want to show that a given formula is true or false with respect to a certain model A and set of valuations V , we just have to come up with a strategy that witnesses this. However, when we prove general properties of the logic it is much more convenient to have an inductive definition of satisfaction. In this section we will define truth inductively with respect to a set of valuations.
The counterpart of independence in strategies will be saturatedness of sets of valuations. 
A |=
We could define the meaning of a formula ϕ in a structure as as a pair consisting of the collection of sets of valuations that satisfy ϕ and the collection of sets of valuations that refute ϕ. Then the meaning of ϕ is a function of the meanings of the subformulas of ϕ and of the way in which they are combined. So meaning assignment is compositional.
We will show that the definition of satisfaction and the game interpretation are equivalent. For this purpose we need the following result about decreasing sets of valuations which will be quite useful. Essentially the same lemma is given as Fact 11.1.1 in Hodges (1997a, p. 57) , for his "trump" semantics. 
Proof. We use induction in the complexity of ϕ. The atomic case and the inductive step for ¬ are clear.
, is a Y -saturated cover of W, and by induction hypothesis A |=
It will be useful to have variants of the clauses from Def. 4.2. In particular we will apply the following variants in the proof of the equivalence of strategy interpretation with the inductive definition.
Theorem 4.7 (Alternative for ∨). A |=
] by downward monotonicity (Lemma 4.6). Then V 1 , V 2 is the required partition. (⇐) A partition is a cover. (
Proof.
(1 ⇒ 2) The definition of satisfaction (Def. 4.2) guarantees the existence of a Y -saturated cover {V i } i∈I of V , and of a corresponding family (a i ) i∈I of elements of A. By the axiom of choice, we may assume I is well ordered by <. Then we may transform {V i } i∈I in a disjoint cover of V by the inductive definition:
a i (the inclusion may be proper because some V i could be empty and thus
The proof of the implication (1 ⇒ 2) in the previous theorem, passing from a cover to a partition, makes an essential use of the axiom of choice. Therefore, the main result from this section depends on the axiom of choice. This axiom could have been avoided if we had used partitions in the inductive clause for (∃) of Def. 4.2. Proof. The theorem is proven by simultaneous induction in the complexity of ϕ:
(at) No moves have to be played, the result follows directly from the definition.
(¬) The players interchange turns, so the result follows immediately from the induction hypothesis.
By induction hypothesis there is a winning strategy
Conversely, let ϕ = ϕ 1 ∨ /Y ϕ 2 and assume S ϕ is a winning strategy for ∃loise with c ϕ as the choice function for
⇐⇒ ∀belard has winning strategies for A, ϕ 1 , V and A, ϕ 2 , V ⇐⇒ ∀belard has a winning strategy (the union of the two) in A,
, and by induction hypothesis there is a winning strategy S ϕ for ∃loise in the game A, ϕ, 
⇐⇒ ∀belard has a winning strategy for A, ψ, V x:A ⇐⇒ ∀belard has a winning strategy for A, ∃x /Y ψ, V , viz. the same one.
In the rest of this paper we will use |= + , and |= − both for satisfaction in terms of strategies (mostly in the explanation of the examples) as for the inductive satisfaction (in formal proofs).
The syntax of IF * is an extension of the syntax of classical predicate logic, and so is its semantics. Thus, positive satisfaction of first order sentences coincides with classical satisfaction. One may expect a difficult proof, because in the Tarskian bottom-up approach only variables occurring in the subformula play a role, whereas in the game theoretic top-down approach all previously encountered variables in principle play a role, even those that do not occur in the subformula. But the proof is surprisingly simple, and does not need the axiom of choice if we use our cover definition (Def. 4.2). We first prove a more general result for classical first order formulas.
Lemma 4.10. Let ϕ be a classical first order formula. Then the following two statements hold:
Proof. We prove the statements by induction on the structure of ϕ. The atomic and negative cases are straightforward.
, which by definition means A |= + ∃xψ [v] .
An immediate consequence of Lemma 4.10, making V = {λ}, is the following result (cf. Ex. 3.1, which gave a counterexample against the analogue for Hintikka's IF). 
for any suitable model A and set of valuations V .
Proof. If ∃loise (resp. ∀belard) has a winning strategy for the game associated with ϕ, the same strategy is good for the game associated with ϕ because the strategy choice functions trivially satisfy the remaining independence conditions.
And, finally, a result on interchanging variables. Note that the left-to-right direction also holds if x does occur bound in ϕ(x).
Lemma 4.13 (Interchanging free variables). If x does not occur bound in ϕ(x), and z does not occur in ϕ(x) nor in dom(V ) then:
Proof. Recall that V [z/x] denotes the set of valuations obtained from V by giving z the role of x. Thus, under the hypotheses, both sides are syntactically and semantically identical, except for the change of x to z.
Expanding valuations
The more variables occur in the domain of the valuations, the more information is available. The information provided by an extra variable may make the difference for a player to win the game for a given IF * -formula or not. For example: 
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction in the complexity of ϕ.
(¬) Trivial.
For the converse, notice that the last statement implies by Lemma 4.6 that (
and by induction hypothesis
Conversely, if the last statement holds then A |=
A and use the induction hypothesis.
This lemma has a reassuring and important consequence for sentences. 
Another consequence is that if valuations are expanded for new variables, the satisfied formulas remain satisfied: 
Proof. Apply Thm 5.1 to V × A Z and then apply Thm 4.6.
After the example given at the beginning of the section, it should be clear that the converse direction (that is: invariance under restrictions) does not hold. However, if we change the formula in the right and make the added variables in the domain unusable by 'slashing them away', we get an equivalence. In order to express this we introduce the following notation: 
Proof. (⇒) If the left hand side holds, this is due to a set of strategy functions f ψ acting on valuations not having x in their domain, due to the conditions put on this variable. Therefore, the functions g ψ (v) = f ψ (v −x ) provide a strategy for the right hand side.
(⇐) If the left hand side does not hold, the same happens with the right hand side, because the possible information that the value of x in V x might give cannot be used due to the slashing of all quantifiers and connectives in ϕ /x that might use this information.
One might ask whether the lemma can be generalized by dropping one of the conditions on x. However, both are needed:
1. If x ∈ dom(V ), the information encoded by x may get lost when we switch to the x-expansions V x . Let V = {yx : 00, 11} and V x = {yx : 00, 01, 10, 11},
2. If x occurs in ϕ, for example: x ∈ Bd (ϕ), then the equivalence may fail because internal dependencies are disturbed. Let V = {λ} and take
Below we quote a result by Hodges in the spirit of this section (reformulated in our terminology), which claims the equivalence between positive satisfaction with respect to a set of valuations and satisfaction with respect to a family of restrictions of this set. One direction of the lemma follows from Lemma 5.3, but we give a counterexample to the other direction. The counterexample illustrates the differences between A |=
Quote 5.6 (Paraphrase of Hodges (1997a) , Lemma 7.4, and of Proposition 3 in Hodges (1997b) ). Let ϑ be a formula with Fr (ϑ) = X, and y ∈ X. Let A be a suitable model and
Then the following two are equivalent: 
Equivalence
One of the aims of this paper is to examine the validity in IF * -logic of analogues of classical equivalences regarding quantifiers. In order to express such laws, we need a notion of equivalence of formulas. A natural one is Game equivalence, shortly G-equivalence, introduced by Caicedo & Krynicki (1999) , p. 24. 
Note that G-equivalence amounts to 'having the same meaning'. In the literature (e.g. Hintikka (1996) , Väänänen (2002)) one also finds another equivalence notion that only makes reference to A |= + . This is clearly a weaker notion as shown by the following example. 
The above example also shows that equivalence with respect to positive satisfaction is not preserved by negations, since we have B |=
. G-equivalence, on the contrary, is clearly preserved under interchange of players, which corresponds to negation in our semantics. In fact, our approach to IF * -logic is in all respects symmetric with respect to the two players, and thus, results on G-equivalences are more informative.
Hodges (1997a) also considers a symmetric notion of equivalence (op.cit. Section 8), similar to the notion of G-equivalence above. But there is a subtle difference. Hodges conceives formulas as having a fixed set of variables (maybe including non occurring ones) and valuations have that set as domain (as does Väänänen (2002)). For equivalence of formulas given as ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and ψ(y 1 , . . . , y m ), this amounts to restricting our quantification "for any V suitable for ϕ and ψ" (meaning
..,y m } ". That this makes the latter notion of equivalence weaker, is shown by the following example:
Example 6.3. Consider the formulas ϕ = ∃x ∃y /u [t = x ∧ u = y] and ψ = ∃z ∃y /u [t = z ∧ u = y] (the result of renaming the bound variable x in ϕ into z). It is easy to verify that for any suitable model A and any V ⊆ A {u,t} :
so ϕ(u, t) and ψ(u, t) are equivalent in Hodges' sense. But ϕ and ψ are not G-equivalent: ∃loise can be seen to have a winning strategy for ϕ proving
because, for the choice of y, she can use the value of z to signal the value of u. But she can't use this trick when playing ψ, because in the first move she has to overwrite the original value of z and make it equal to t. So:
Note that this shows that ϕ (u, t, z) and ψ(u, t, z) are not equivalent in Hodges' sense. It follows that the claim in (Hodges 1997a, preceding Thm 7.5 ) that the meaning of a formula with respect to its free variables determines its meaning with respect to any extended list of variables, is problematic if the new variables are allowed to be bound within the formula (cf. Thms 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3).
We give some basic facts concerning negation and a substitution rule that states that subformulas with the same meaning can be substituted for each other without changing the meaning of the formula in which the substitution is performed. 
De Morgan's laws hold for connectives and quantifiers:
¬(ϕ ∨ /Y ψ) ≡ G ¬ϕ ∧ /Y ¬ψ and ¬(ϕ ∧ /Y ψ) ≡ G ¬ϕ ∨ /Y ¬ψ ¬ ∃x /Y ψ ≡ G ∀x /Y ¬ψ and ¬ ∀x /Y ψ ≡ G ∃x /Y ¬ψ. 3. Substitution of equivalents: if ϕ ≡ G ψ then ϑ ≡ G ϑ[ϕ:ψ].
Negation normal form: for any ϕ there is ψ in the symbols ∨, ∧, ¬, ∃, ∀
where the negations only affect atomic formulas, such that ϕ ≡ G ψ. Proof. For 1. and 2. apply the definition of satisfaction (Def. 4.2) and for ∧ and ∀ Def. 2.2. The substitution property follows by a straightforward induction in the complexity of ϑ. The negation normal form is obtained by repeated use of 2. and 3.
Moreover, we have an unexpected result on removing slashes from connectives. Note the ambiguous character of the new notation: we may choose at will to add or not to add /x to the unslashed quantifiers and connectives of ϕ. In any case we have: Theorem 6.7. Let ϕ be a formula where the variable x does not occur, then
Proof. Since not containing x is a property inherited by subformulas, we may prove this by induction on the complexity of ϕ. The atomic case as well as the inductive step for ¬, and for occurrences of ∃ and ∨ slashed by /x in ϕ| x are obvious by substitution of G-equivalents, and from left to right the equivalence follows from Lemma 4.12. Therefore, we verify the inductive step:
and by Lemma 5.5 again: A |= 
which by induction hypothesis is the same as
The above equivalence fails if we do not add /x to all slashed connectives and quantifiers of ϕ. For example, let ϕ be ∃u
{zx : 00, 11} because ∃loise must choose u constant and there is no way of knowing at ∨ /zx whether z equals that constant or not, but
, by the strategy:
{zx : 00, 11} by the strategy:
However, the analogue of most classical laws for connectives and quantifiers do not hold in full generality for G-equivalence. A result that one might expect is that under certain conditions renaming of bound variables is allowed, as claimed in (Caicedo & Krynicki (1999) , Lemma 3.1(a)):
Quote 6.8. Let ϕ be an IF * -formula and z a variable that does not occur in
Surprisingly, this is, not the case. There are two types of counterexamples.
Example 6.9 (First type: renaming blocks signals from outside). In Ex. 6.3 we saw that
This non-equivalence is reflected in the games for the following two sentences. Consider (in an arbitrary model):
A winning strategy for ∃loise is to choose if u = z then L, if u = z then R, and next to choose x := t and y := z; with the effect that y = z. Let now x be renamed into z. According to the quote given above and substitution of G-equivalents, this should be G-equivalent with:
However, in models with at least two elements ∃loise has no winning strategy for (4). The strategy that was winning for (3) no longer works, because the value of z is now the latest value chosen for z. So, (3) and (4) are not equivalent.
Example 6.10 (Second type: new signals can be created). Consider again the sentence (4), and change the z's bound by the outermost ∀z into w, thus obtaining:
Now (5) is true because the value of u can be signalled to ∃y /u : the strategy y := w is always winning, whereas (4) is not true in models with at least two elements. This example shows also that the above renaming law even fails for sentences.
We have seen in the previous examples, and other examples will follow, that several classical laws do not hold for G-equivalence of open formulas, either due to the blocking of signals from outside, or due to the creation of new signalling possibilities. These examples show the rather natural notion of G-equivalence of Def. 6.1 to be more tricky than one would expect: it contains a quantification over all suitable sets of valuations V , i.e. implicitly over all possible domains containing the free variables of the formulas. However, we will introduce a family of equivalence relations, which are weaker in the sense that they express equivalence only with respect to domains that avoid certain variables, and show that those laws hold for the weaker equivalences. In this way, many classical laws will be recovered for sentences, because for them the new relations will all be as strong as G-equivalence.
Definition 6.11. Let Z be a set of variables. 
Moreover, sentences are Z-closed for any Z, and for them ≡ Z coincides with ≡ G due to Thm 5.2.
In the following, we will write x-closed, xy-closed, etc. for {x}-closed, {x, y}-closed, respectively. Likewise, we write ϕ
We may state now two correct renaming laws with respect to these restricted equivalences.
Theorem 6.12 (Renaming bound variables, I). Let z be a variable not occurring in Qx /Y ϕ(x). If x does not occur bound in ϕ(x) nor in Y then:
Proof. Both formulas are xz-closed by hypothesis and construction; that is, x and z are not among their free variables. It is enough to consider the existential quantifier. Let V be suitable for ∃x /Y ϕ(x) and ∃z /Y ϕ(z) in a suitable model A, with x, z ∈ dom(V ). Due to the last condition on x and z for any function The following result gives a stronger renaming theorem which puts minimal restrictions on the domain of the valuations and on the variable x, but it may introduce new free occurrences of the variable x in the resulting formula.
Theorem 6.13 (Renaming bound variables, II). Let z be a variable not occurring in Qx /Y ϕ(x) and distinct from x. If x does not occur bound in ϕ(x) then
Notice that x may belong to Y .
Proof. The first formula is z-closed by hypothesis, and the second may acquire a new free variable x, but remains z-closed because x is distinct from z. Let V be suitable for ∃x /Y ϕ(x) and ∃z /Y ϕ(z) /x in a suitable model A, with z ∈ dom(V ). By the last condition we have ( 
. Finally, note that by the hypothesis x does not occur in ϕ(z). Therefore, we may apply Theorem 6.7 and substitution of G-equivalents to change ϕ(z) /x into ϕ(z)| x .
The condition that x is not bound in ϕ(x) is needed in both renaming theorems. If we rename the outermost ∀x in the formula ∀x[u = x ∨ ∃x∃y /u [t = x ∧ u = y]] according to Thm 6.12, the resulting formula
is not xz-equivalent to the former, since ∃loise does not have a winning strategy for the first with respect to the model B and the set of valuation V = {0, 1} {u,t} , but she has one for the second formula: choose right in the disjunction if u = z, then choose x := t and y := z. Likewise, if we rename ∀x according to Thm 6.13, the resulting formula:
is not z-equivalent to the first, because ∃loise does not have a winning strategy for the first with respect to B and V = {0, 1} {u,t,x} , but the strategy described for the second formula above is also winning for the third.
Examples. In contrast with 6.9, Renaming I (i.e. Thm 6.12) shows that
and Renaming II (i.e. Thm 6.13) yields
Since Renaming II permits x to belong to Y, we have also
showing the way to eliminate self-slashed quantifiers.
The substitution of Z-equivalent subformulas in Z-closed formulas does not always yield Z-equivalent formulas. For example, using the equivalence from (6) in the sentence (3) of Example 6.9, yields the non G-equivalent sentence (4); hence, these two sentences are not xz-equivalent. The only obstacle to safe substitution in this example is the presence of the outermost quantifier ∀z in (3) because, in the inductive definition of satisfaction, it forces evaluating ∃x∃y /u [t = x ∧ u = y] at a set of valuations containing z in its domain, for which the equivalence is not granted.
In this line of thought, it should be clear that the substitution principle holds for Z-equivalence if the subformula ψ to be substituted in ϕ is not under the scope of any quantifier binding a variable appearing in Z (in that case, if we do the inductive evaluation of ϕ with a set of valuations V such that
Theorem 6.14 (substitution of Z-equivalents). Let ϑ, ϕ and ψ be Z-closed formulas, where ϕ is a subformula of ϑ not under the scope of any quantifier Qz with z in Z. Then ϑ[ϕ:ψ] is Z-closed and
ϕ ≡ Z ψ =⇒ ϑ ≡ Z ϑ[ϕ : ψ].
Proof. Notice first that ϑ[ϕ:ψ] inherits Z-closedness of ϑ and ψ since F r(ϑ[ϕ:ψ]) ⊆ F r(ϑ)∪F r(ψ).
Assume ϕ ≡ Z ψ. Then we show by induction in the complexity of ϑ that whenever ϕ is not under the scope of a Z-quantifier in ϑ, and A and V are suitable for ϑ and ϑ [ϕ:ψ] , with Z ∩ dom(V ) = ∅ : 
follows from the definition of positive and negative satisfaction for ∨ /Y .
Let ϑ be ∃x /Y σ(x). If ϕ does not occur as subformula of σ(x) there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, σ(x) can not be under the scope of a Z-quantifier in ϑ by hypothesis and thus x / ∈ Z. Therefore, σ(x) inherits Z-closedness from ϑ, and
Example 6.15. Renaming z as x, according to Renaming II, gives:
which may be substituted in (4) of Example 6.9 to yield
This example shows the way to eliminate nested quantifications of the same variable. A general theorem proving this will be given in Section 9.
All the equivalences we exhibit in this paper are of the form ϕ ≡ Z ψ with Z ⊆ Bd(ϕ, ψ). The following lemma shows that it is enough to consider this case.
Lemma 6.16. For any Z-closed ϕ and ψ we have:
Proof. The implication from right to left is trivial. For the other direction, suppose that ϕ ≡ Z ψ and ϕ ≡ Z∩Bd(ϕ,ψ) ψ. The last inequivalence implies that there are A and V suitable for ϕ and ψ such that dom(V ) ∩ Z ∩ Bd(ϕ, ψ) = ∅, and say:A |= 
In Dechesne (2005) the relation ϕ ≡ Bd(ϕ,ψ) ψ was introduced under the name safe equivalence, and denoted ϕ ≡ S ψ. The above lemma implies that for any pair of Bd(ϕ, ψ)-closed formulas ϕ and ψ, and any Z for which they are also Z-closed: ϕ ≡ Z ψ implies that ϕ ≡ S ψ. Therefore, all the results in this paper hold for safe equivalence.
Quantifier extraction
In order to obtain a prenex form theorem we need a theorem that allows to shift quantifiers to the front of a formula. For classical logic this goes by quantifier extraction rules like Qx[ϕ] ∨ ψ ≡ Qx [ϕ ∨ ψ] , with the condition that x does not occur free in ψ. A generalization to IF * has to take care of the possibility that slashed quantifiers in ψ receive signals from Qx. We consider the generalization as proposed in Caicedo & Krynicki (1999) , which uses the notation introduced in 6.6 unambiguously as indicating the result of adding /x to the quantifiers but not to the unslashed connectives.
Quote 7.1 (Caicedo & Krynicki (1999) 
, p. 26). If x does not occur free in ϕ then
After our observations concerning renaming variables, one may become suspicious about the just mentioned version of quantifier extraction. Could the extracted quantifier not block signals coming from outside to ψ? Couldn't the extracted quantifier give rise to new signalling possibilities? The next examples show that these phenomena indeed arise.
Example 7.2 (Extracted quantifier may block outside signals).
We have:
because ∃loise has a winning strategy: at the first disjunction she chooses L if x = z, and R otherwise. At the second disjunction she plays R and then y := x. Since x = z it follows that y = z. However, after quantifier extraction according to the proposal mentioned above we have:
The strategy given for (7), does not work for (8) because the value of the outermost x is not available at ∃y /zx . The only strategy allowed for ∃y /zx is a constant strategy, and in this case no such strategy can be winning. For a proof that ∃loise has no winning strategy see Janssen & Dechesne (2006) . In sum,
Example 7.3 (Extracting a quantifier may produce inside signals).
We have
because for ∃u /z and ∨ /z ∃loise can only follow constant strategies, so she either always ends with the subformula u = z or always with u = z. But with a constant choice for u either of them can turn out to be false, depending on the play of ∀belard. So she has no winning strategy. After application of the rule in Quote 7.1 ∃loise has a winning strategy:
Her strategy is to choose at the disjunction L if x = z, and R if x = z. For ∃u /zx she chooses 0, and at ∨ /z she chooses L if x = 0 (there also u = z), and R if x = 0 (then u = z). In sum,
Note that this example is not about embedding of quantifiers, but about information flow at disjunctions. These need to be studied carefully. The problem from Example 7.2 (blocking outside signals) can be avoided by restricting the equivalence to ≡ x , whereas Example 7.3 suggests that all disjunctions that come under the scope of the extracted quantifier have to be slashed. Indeed, in that way a formula is obtained that is equivalent with (9). This will follow from Theorem 7.5, but we may verify directly that:
However adding a slash to just one of the disjuncts might be sufficient as well because (12) and (13) are, just as (9), not true in B:
In particular (13) is attractive because no new slashes are introduced in the main disjunction. We tried to find counterexamples to Quote 7.1 resembling Ex. 7.3 in which it was necessary to slash the main connective after extracting the quantifier, but we did not succeed. This is due to a surprising result that will be explained in the next section (Theorem 8.
3) The formulation of Quote 7.1 only deals with situations where the original formula does not have slashed connectives because the authors first apply a theorem that removes slashed connectives. However, we give here a more general quantifier extraction theorem which gives us more insights on IF * -logic and will allow for more general prenex forms. In the proof of we will use the following observation that follows easily from the definition of saturation.
Lemma 7.4. Let X be a set of variables and x ∈ X. Then the following two properties hold:
1. For any v, w ∈ A X and respective
Theorem 7.5 (Quantifier extraction over connectives, I). If x does not occur in ψ nor in Y ∪ Z, then
and similarly for conjunctions
Proof. Let A be a suitable model and V ⊆ A X such that x / ∈ X. We consider the different cases. 
, and also A |= + ψ[V 2 ] by Lemma 5.5. Moreover, the V i form a Z-saturated cover of V by the previous lemma, thus A |= 
The case of conjunctions follows from De Morgan laws.
Omitting slashed variables in connectives under quantifiers
In this section we will prove some results on eliminations of slashed variables in connectives which will lead to a refinement of the quantifier extraction rule. As we saw in the discussion of example 7.3, adding the independence of x at the main disjunction may not be necessary when extracting quantifiers. This is explained by the next lemma.
Lemma 8.1 (Elimination of slash under ∃). If Z ⊆ Y and x is not in Y then
∃x /Y [ψ 1 ∨ /Zx ψ 2 ] ≡ x ∃x /Y [ψ 1 ∨ /Z ψ 2 ]
In particular, it always holds that ∃x
In game terms, all the information available when the verifying player chooses x, is still available when this player chooses at the disjunction, meaning she can 'recalculate' the value of x if she needs it. We prove the lemma formally:
Proof. Let A be suitable structure and V ⊆ A X a set of valuations for the given formulas such that x / ∈ X. It is enough to show the implication from right to left by Lemma 4.12. The analogue of the previous lemma holds for a universal quantifier ∀x /Y under quite a different hypothesis: the 'right disjunct' must be of the form ψ /x where ψ does not contain x and no condition is put on Y and Z.
Lemma 8.2 (Elimination of slash under ∀). If x does not occur in ψ nor in Y , then
Proof. Let A be suitable structure and V ⊆ A X a set of valuations for the given formulas such that x / ∈ X. (+) We have to prove only that A |=
, and again by this lemma:
for some c and thus v x:c ∼ Z w x:c , which implies w x:c ∈ W 2 since w x:c ∈ V x:A and W 2 is saturated in
Since in the negative evaluation of a disjunction the variables under the slash do not play any role, we have:
Combining the above results for Z = ∅ with theorems 7.5 and 6.7, and utilizing substitution of G-equivalents and De Morgan laws, we can now state the following refinement to quantifier extraction; note that the extraction rule for classical logic is a special case.
Theorem 8.3 (Quantifier extraction over connectives II). If x does not occur in ψ nor in Y , then:
and similarly for unslashed conjunctions.
Regular formulas
Given a set of variables Z, the property of being Z-closed is preserved by all logical operators, but is not inherited by subformulas: ∃x(x = x) is x-closed but x = x is not. The following related property is inherited by subformulas (although it is not preserved by logical operators), and it will be needed in our prenex form theorem. 
is regular but the following are not regular:
For classical logic, Hilbert & Ackermann (1959) , p. 74, argue that the regular fragment should be taken as the standard version of predicate logic. They imply that irregular formulas would result in unnecessary complications, and that such formulas would not expand the expressive power. Indeed, in classical first order logic a formula with two nested quantifications of the same variable is equivalent with a formula in which one of the two variables is renamed to a fresh variable. As we have seen (Examples 6.9 and 6.10), in IF * such plain renaming does not yield G-equivalent formulas. However, the example 6.15 suggests a way to regularize IF * -formulas utilizing Renaming II. Proof. Let Z = {z 1 , ..., z n } be a set of distinct variables not occurring in ϑ, one for each subformula of ϑ of the form Qx /Y ϕ(x), which is under the scope of a quantifier Q x or is part of a subformula where x is free (that is, a counterexample to regularity of ϑ).
Start with a subformula σ of the form described above of minimal length. By minimality, x does not appear bound in ϕ(x), thus σ
by Renaming II (Theorem 6.13). Since z 1 does not occur in ϑ, this equivalence
by z 1 -substitution. Notice that the second formula has the same free variables as ϑ: if σ was under the scope of a quantifier Q x, because the latter binds the new slashed occurrences of x in ϕ(z 1 )| x . If σ was part of a subformula where x appeared free, because the new slashed occurrences of x in ϕ(z 1 )| x do not increase the set of possible free variables of ϑ.
Applying the same procedure to the formula ϑ[σ:
and continuing in this way, we may rename consecutively all the "irregular" quantified variables of ϑ obtaining a chain ϑ ≡ z1 ϑ 1 ≡ z2 .... ≡ zn ϑ n , where ϑ n is regular, has the same free variables that ϑ, and Bd(ϑ n ) = Bd(ϑ) ∪ Z. Since no z i occurs free in any ϑ j by construction, we have ϑ ≡ Z ϑ 1 ≡ Z .... ≡ Z ϑ n , and thus ϑ ≡ Z ϑ n by transitivity.
The last claim of the theorem follows because in ϕ(z 1 )| x we may choose which operators to slash with x among those originally non-slashed, due to Thm 6.7.
A regular formula ϑ may still contain multiple (non nested) quantifications of the same variable, those may be eliminated without adding new free variables utilizing Renaming I (Theorem 6.12): Z-equivalence has the substitution property in regular contexts without any further condition. If a subformula of a regular formula is replaced by a Zequivalent one, and the result is regular, then Z-equivalent formulas are obtained. Bd(ϕ, ψ) . Therefore, by Lemma 6.16 and the Z -substitution theorem 6.14
Prenex and Skolem forms
We have now constructed the building blocks necessary to support a prenex form for IF * -formulas; one that corrects the corresponding theorem from Caicedo & Krynicki (1999) . Proof. By the Strong Regularization Theorem, (Thm 9.4), for any ϑ there is a regular variant ϑ such that each variable in ϑ is quantified over at most once, F r(ϑ) = F r(ϑ ), F r(ϑ) ⊆ F r(ϑ ), and ϑ ≡ Z ϑ for some Z ⊆ Bd(ϑ ). By regularity, the hypothesis of Theorem 7.5 applies to any subformula of ϑ of the form Qx /Y ϕ(x) ∨ /Z ψ (that is, x is not in ψ, Y or Z). Applying this theorem to the subformula and using substitution of x-equivalents, which can be applied again by regularity of ϑ, a chain ϑ ≡ x 1 ... ≡ x n ϑ P is obtained where regularity is maintained, all the formulas have the same free and bound variables, x i ∈ Bd(ϑ ) = Bd(ϑ P ), and ϑ P is in prenex form. Therefore, Proof. According to Theorem 9.4, the strong regularization ϕ may be chosen to preserve any desired set of unslashed connectives and quantifiers, then we may use Theorem 8.3 instead of Theorem 7.5 to extract quantifiers, obtaining ϕ P which preserves any desired set of unslashed operators.
Corollary 10.3 (Prenex form for sentences). Any IF * -sentence is Gequivalent with an IF
* -sentence in prenex form.
If we compute the prenex form of a non-prenex classical formula in IF * according to Theorem 10.2, we may choose to maintain all connectives and quantifiers unslashed, in which case we obtain a classical prenex formula. But we may choose also to maintain the connectives unslashed but apply full slashing to the quantifiers when applying the extraction rules, obtaining thus a non-classical prenex form of a classical formula. The following example shows that then the subsequent Skolemization procedure results in a more economical Skolem form (i.e. where the sum of the arities of the Skolem functions is minimal).
Example 10.4 (IF * -Skolem forms for a classical formula). Consider the first order sentence: (u, v, w) Classically, there are several ways to put this formula in prenex form, depending on the order in which we extract the quantifiers. If we give the leftmost block of quantifiers the widest scope, we get (15), which yields the Skolem form (16).
(15) ∀x∃y∀z∃u∀v∃w [R(x, y, z) ∨ Q(u, v, w) ] (g(x, z), v, h(x, z, v) 
)]
Giving the rightmost block widest scope first, results in a different Skolem form: (c, v, g(v) )]
On the other hand, using the IF * -prenex form and giving the first block widest scope, we get the following prenex and Skolem forms respectively: (c, v, g(v) )]
Note that (19) is simpler than both (16) and (17) because the IF * -prenex procedure does not introduce unnecessary dependencies like the classical prenex procedure. The resulting Skolem form is independent of the order of extraction of quantifiers, up to interchange of universal quantifiers.
Vacuous quantifiers
In the next section we will show that a prenex normal form is possible in which no slashed connectives occur. In that process additional quantifiers will be introduced. Such introduction must be done carefully, and in this section we investigate the dangers. For instance, adding a vacuous quantifier (what classically is innocent) may evoke the same signalling phenomena we have encountered with renaming:
A winning strategy is to play at ∨ the strategy if x = z then L else R followed by y := z. This strategy, however, cannot be applied after the introduction of a vacuous ∀z quantifier:
, because then the value of the outermost z is overwritten by that of the innermost. Therefore, The first phenomenon is dealt with by restricting the equivalence (in the given example) to ≡ z . To neutralize the new signalling possibilities we see two approaches.
One approach is to make the new variable unusable by slashing with that variable all later choices of the formula. In fact, we do not have to slash all of them but only those already slashed:
Theorem 11.1 (Safely adding vacuous quantifiers I). Let x be a variable that does not occur in ϕ or Y. Then:
Proof. Assume A and V are suitable for ϕ and ∃x /Y [ϕ /x ] and x ∈ dom(V ). This is possible because x ∈ Y. After Lemma 5.5 and Thm 6.7 we have: A |=
. Similarly for the universal quantifier.
The other approach to neutralize the new signaling possibilities of a vacuous quantifier is to prohibit that the new variable encodes usable information by slashing the new quantifier itself. That is, the independence conditions are put on the added quantifier instead of the formula. However, we have been be able to do that only for regular formulas.
First we need a lemma on expanding domains that does not introduce slashes in the formula (as is in the first theorem on expanding, viz. Thm 5.5). 
Proof. By induction in the complexity of ϕ. The atomic case, and the inductive step for (¬, ±), are immediate, and the implication from left to right follows from an application of Thm 5.3. So it remains to check only the inductive step for (∨, ±) and (∃, ±) from right to left. Notice that we assume the induction hypothesis for all possible Z ϕ -independent functions.
Hence, by the induction hypothesis we know A |=
f , and thus w ∈ V 1 because x ∈ dom(V ). This shows that V 1 is Y -saturated, the same holds for V 2 , and it follows that A |=
The case A |= − ϕ[V x:f ] follows straightforwardly from the induction hypothesis.
(∃) Let ϕ be ∃z /Y ψ and assume A |=
. Now x and z are distinct (because x does not occur in ϕ) and z is not in dom(V ) because it is bound in ϕ . So (V x:f ) z:g may be seen as (V z:g * ) x:f * where g
* is independent of the set Z ψ ⊆ Z ϕ ∪ {z} by construction, and 
Together with lemma 11.2 this proves the result.
Elimination of slashed connectives
If ϕ has slashed connectives, its prenex form will have slashed connectives. One might prefer a theorem in which a formula is equivalent with one that consists of a prefix with possibly slashed formulas, followed by a classical matrix: a propositional formula without any slashes. We will show that such a form is possible. The price to be paid is that the structure of the matrix may be much more complex than of the given formula. First we consider approaches from the literature to elimination of slashed connectives.
A natural solution is proposed by Caicedo & Krynicki (1999, p. 24) . We give a simplified formulation by neglecting the case of models with only one element (s and t are variables that do not occur in ϕ ∨ /Y ψ).
After all our experience with signalling, one will not be surprised that this proposal suffers from both problems we have seen before. The first problem is that new quantifiers may block signals from outside; as in previous cases this can be solved by using s,t-equivalence.
The second problem is that the new quantifiers may give rise to new possibilities for signalling. Consider the following example (the two identical disjuncts are not a printing error):
For each ∃x /yu only a constant strategy yielding a fixed value is possible. So ∃loise may guide the game to at most two distinct values for x. But in models with at least three elements ∀belard has more choices available for his ∀u. So (21) is not true in such models.
According to (20), sentence (21) would be equivalent with:
However, the existential quantifiers create new possibilities for ∃loise: in her first moves she can assign the value of u to s and t, and satisfy the left disjunct by choosing for x the value of s. A careful reader may have noticed that the fact that the main disjunction is slashed for y, plays no role of importance in this example. Indeed, with ∨ instead of ∨ /y , sentence (21) would have been a counterexample to the claim as well, but arguably a less convincing one, as there would be no slashed connectives to eliminate. One may check that (21) also is a counterexample if we use Hintikka's implicit slashing convention.
Even though Hintikka does not explicitly formulate an elimination theorem, the slashed connectives in IF-logic are eliminated in the translation procedure from IF-logic to Σ 1 1 . In Hintikka (1996, p.52 ) the second order translation (24) of (23) in which the slashed connective is eliminated:
Apparently it is assumed here that there is a constant 0 in the language, and implicitly, that the model has at least two elements. Based upon these idea's we may formulate as (restricted!) elimination rule:
However, one special constant is not enough. Consider the corresponding equivalent of (21):
∃loise can still choose the value of s equal to the value of u. At the disjunction she chooses left if s = 0, and right otherwise. In both cases, she wins by choosing for x the value of s. So, also the rule underlying Hintikka's translation procedure fails due to signalling.
Because of the already mentioned assumption that models contain at least two elements, the problem can be avoided by assuming two distinct special constants:
Theorem 12.1 (Elimination using two constants). 
This is an improvement (with analogous proof) of Dechesne (2005) . But this theorem does not provide a solution to our aim of obtaining a prenex form theorem without slashed connectives because it puts requirements on the language and its interpretation, and on the size of models. Below we give a solution that works without such requirements, at the cost of a more complex translation and a long proof that we have been not able to simplify. Its proof uses the following lemma about one element domains. 
Proof. Denote the left formula in the equivalence by ϑ, and the right one by ϑ . Let A and V ⊆ A X be suitable for these formulas, with X disjoint of {s, t, u} ∩ Bd (ϕ, ψ) . We must prove:
If V = ∅ the equivalence is trivial. If |A| = 1, and V = ∅, then V is a singleton and the equivalence follows from Lemma 12.2 since ϑ c , ϑ c are easily seen to be first order equivalent. Therefore, we will assume V = ∅ and |A| ≥ 2 for the rest of the proof. 
Finally, since A |=
Conversely, assume A |=
. Since no W = ∅ satisfies the left disjunct of ϑ because |A| ≥ 2, we have, consecutively: * A |=
and the V i are automatically Y -saturated. By Lemma 5.1, A |=
For negative satisfaction, it is enough to prove that (26) and (27) are equivalent:
Now, (26) 
(take the empty set of valuations for for the left disjuncts u = s, and u = t). Thus (27) follows by choosing a = b and interpreting s and t by constant functions of value a and b, respectively. Conversely, from (27) it follows consecutively * A |= Proof. Apply in order: the regularization theorem, the previous theorem combined with the substitution theorem for regular formulas to eliminate all slashed disjunctions, and then the special prenex theorem, maintaining the connectives unslashed.
Other Properties, interchange of quantifiers
If one would aim at other or more specific normal forms, with some standard order of the quantifiers, or disjunctive or conjunctive normal forms, further equivalences and rules are needed. We end this paper with some caveats when transferring classical rules to the IF-setting, followed by some extra quantifier rules that do hold.
We know that B |=
, as ∃loise can play the following winning strategy: at the disjunction, play if x = 0 then L, otherwise R; at the left ∃y /x always y := 0; at the right ∃y /x always y := 1. Essentially the same 'empowering' effect of duplication of subformulas disturbs the following classical rule relevant for making conjunctive normal forms.
We consider here an example interpreted on the natural numbers. The language is extended with the predicates Even(x) and Odd(x) (with the obvious interpretations). It is clear that ∃loise has no winning strategy for ∀x [(Even(x) 
] ∃loise has a winning strategy: for the leftmost occurrence of ∃y /x she always plays y := 1, for the rightmost y := 0, and for ∨ she chooses according to the value of x. Related examples are given by Nurmi (2005) , who investigates for which formulas with one free variable ϕ |= + ψ holds (it turns out that it does so only for few combinations).
The winning strategy for x = y ∨ (x = 0 ∨ /x x = 0) is to choose R for ∨ if x = y, and to use y as a signal for the value of x. However there is no winning strategy for ∃loise in (x = y ∨ x = 0) ∨ /x x = 0. 
Exchanging quantifiers of the same type ∀z∃x∃y
The classical rule that allows the exchange of two consecutive existential quantifiers does not hold. We have B |= + ∀z∃x∃y /z [y = z] because ∃loise has the winning strategy x := z, then y := x. But B |= + ∀z∃y /z ∃x[y := z] because any strategy for ∃loise must choose y := a constant, the value chosen for x not being of any help. Taking negations we have a similar failure for interchange of consecutive ∀.
This example illustrates again the point that signalling gives unexpected results, even in case there is no embedding of quantifiers binding the same variable. For positive results, see Theorems 13.1 and 13.3 below.
In van Benthem (2003) it is pointed out that one may find quantifier exchange rules by a change of perspective. Two consecutive, but independent choices G and H can be viewed as being played in parallel, in game algebraic notation G × H. Game algebra teaches us that G × H = H × G. 
However, these two formulas are xy-equivalent as a special case of the next theorem which shows the rule holds under restricted equivalence. A consequence of the previous results is a felicitous generalization of the classical exchange rule for identical quantifiers: 
A similar result holds for positive occurrences of ∨ /Z .
The idea of the proof (for positive satisfaction) is that if the subformula ∃y /Z ψ occurs positively then ∃loise has to make a choice there. If she has a winning strategy at that point she may turn it in a winning strategy for ∃y /Zx by executing the strategy for the outermost ∃x /Y again and then use the value of x as an input for the strategy at ∃y /Z (or ∨ /Z ). Because Z ⊆ Y, this combination is a Zx-independent strategy. The reciprocal direction is obvious. As to negative satisfaction, a winning strategy of ∀belard for refutation at ∃y /Z should work for ∃y /Zx , and viceversa, since it does not take in account the independence restriction. For a positive occurrence of ∨ /Z the argument is identical. Now some form of regularity of ∃x /Y ϕ and some restriction in the domain of the valuations considered are needed in the previous theorem because ∃x /y ∃x∃z /y [y = z] ≡ x ∃x /y ∃x∃z /yx [y = z] since ∃loise may choose the value of second ∃x to signal y to ∃z in the first formula, but this is impossible in the second formula. Moreover, because under the set of valuations {yu : 00, 11} ∃loise has a winning strategy for the first formula: x := u, u := 0, z := x, but she does not have one for the second. As the informal argument above does not precise these facts, we prefer to provide an inductive proof.
Proof. (of Thm 13.4) Without loss of generality we may assume that ϕ is in negation normal form. We show by induction in the complexity of ϕ, starting at ϕ := ∃y /Z ψ that for any A and V suitable for ∃x /Y ϕ, (1.) and (2.) below hold:
( 1. It follows from the proof that we only need to ask regularity of ∃x /Y ϕ with respect to the bound variables that have the subformula in their scope.
Obviously, we have a similar result for positive occurrences of ∀y /Z or ∧ /Z in ∀x /Y ϕ. The connection of this result with the game theoretical Thompson transformation of Inflation-Deflation (Thompson 1952 ) is interesting; see Dechesne (2006) . This generalization explains the issue of the 'implicit slashing' (Hintikka's convention, see p. 8). The above theorem teaches us for which formulas the evaluation could alter by imposing the convention: e.g. for Hodges example ∀z∃x ∃y /z [y = z], which does not satisfy the condition that Z ⊆ Y (in this case: Z = {z} while Y = ∅).
Conclusion
We defined a general logic with imperfect information, with both a game semantics and an equivalent compositional semantics. We had to rethink the basic notions of equivalence, yielding new, slightly restricted, equivalences. We obtained new quantifiers exchange rules and quantifier extraction rules, and corrected several published results. We proved a prenex form theorem for the logic, and as a side result we found a method to obtain a simple Skolem form for classical logic. Our research has shown that signalling is an important method in imperfect information games that has impact on any properties of the logic.
